Morocco General Election 2026

Background

Moroccans are scheduled to vote in a general election on September 23 that sees all 395 seats in the House of Representatives contested. The results will determine the composition of the next government, after which King Mohammed VI will appoint a new prime minister from the party that wins the most seats.

The 2021 general election saw the National Rally of Independents (RNI) win the majority of seats. RNI president Aziz Akhannouch was appointed as prime minister after forming a three-party coalition with the Istiqlal Party and the Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM). In February, Akhannouch stepped down as the head of RNI, saying he would not run again for election. Mohamed Chouki was elected to lead the party, with Istiqlal’s Nizar Baraka and PAM’s Fatima Ezzahra El Mansouri emerging as some of this election’s central figures.

This year’s elections are taking place amid social and economic challenges. Last year, 2025, was marked by youth-led protests. National youth unemployment sits at approximately 22%. While urban youth face chronic unemployment, rural youth bear the compounding effect of sustained drought on agricultural livelihoods. Poor economic conditions were also cited as a key driver behind thousands of migrants attempting to enter the Spanish enclave of Ceuta in late July. Another mass-crossing attempt has been suggested for September 23, the day of the election, although this remains unconfirmed at the time of publication.

The following threats have been assessed to impact samdesk clients in the upcoming elections:

• Polling Station Violence - Probable

• Protests - Likely

• Terrorism - Possible

• Cybersecurity threat - Almost Certain
  
  

Physical Security Analysis 

The election falls on a Wednesday, a working day, with the school year running since September 7. Ministries have been instructed to make staff and equipment available to local authorities. Reduced availability of public offices, counter services and schools hosting polling stations is therefore possible.

Polling Station Violence 

The risk of disruption, such as arson or forced entry, at or around election infrastructure has been assessed as probable. A coordinated or armed attack on electoral infrastructure is; however, unlikely. 

Voting will be held in public buildings, including educational institutions, which the Interior Ministry has been inspecting for readiness nationwide. The ministry has established 40,700 polling stations and 3,750 centralizing offices. Approximately 350,000 personnel will administer the poll for some 15.8 million registered voters. The Kofi Annan Foundation's Electoral Vulnerability Index 2026-2027 assigns Morocco a risk score of 48.1, with a 91.2% predicted likelihood of electoral violence, 86.1% for moderate violence and 5.1% for severe violence. Escalation is more likely to originate locally than through organized action, as vote-buying remains endemic in rural and low-income constituencies and is a recurrent source of disputes at polling venues. 

During the 2025 unrest, some protesters looted and vandalized state-run administrative buildings in the Souss-Massa region. Protesters forced entry and damaged civil registry offices in Sidi Bibi; they also damaged the Royal Gendarmerie post in Lqliaa, and set fire to an administrative headquarters in Taroudant. As a result, educational institutions are at elevated risk as they will be state-operated premises during the elections. This risk is concentrated in the Souss-Massa region, consistent with protest hotspots in 2025.

Protests  

Gen Z Protests

The risk of renewed youth-led unrest around the 2026 election has been assessed as likely. Underlying issues remain unresolved, and the movement's decentralized structure means further protest activity does not require centralized coordination to occur.

In late September, 2025, youth-led protests known as GenZ 212 emerged. The movement was triggered by public outrage over the post-partum deaths of eight women in an Agadir hospital. Protesters contrasted state spending on World Cup infrastructure with underfunded health and education systems. Between the months of September and October, the protests that followed were widespread, sustained and decentralized, occurring in both Morocco’s main urban centers and more marginalized areas. At least three people were killed, with hundreds injured and thousands arrested. Protests took place outside Moroccan embassies and consulates internationally as well. 

There has been no confirmation of GenZ 212-led protests being planned ahead of the election. In early August, the group made an official statement regarding screenshots and posts calling for demonstrations, stating that the posts did not originate from the group's administration or its official server.

However, the movement’s underlying grievances (youth unemployment, corruption, poor functioning of public services and dissatisfaction with the Akhannouch government) have remained largely unaddressed. Alongside demonstrations at the time there were reports of clashes, looting, attacks on public buildings, as well as road disruptions and blockades. This pattern is likely to repeat in the event of renewed protests surrounding the 2026 election.

Pro-Palestine Protests

The risk of a pro-Palestine protest taking place around the election period has been assessed as likely. In Rabat, these protests are frequently organized by the Moroccan Front for the Support of Palestine and Against Normalization and National Action Group for Palestine/Morocco. In April, 2025, protests took place near Parliament, on Mohammed V Avenue and from Bab El Had to Bab El Rouah. April, 2026, saw protesters take a similar route, gathering at Bab El Had Square, before marching along Mohammed V Avenue towards Rabat-Ville Station, ending the march at Parliament. As recently as September 8, activists were gathered in front of the Parliament building in Rabat.  Blockades, road closures, and transit disruptions around this area are probable, with tear gas deployment, clashes, and scuffles being likely. 

Moreover, visits from Israeli government officials to Morocco during the election period are almost certain to trigger protests, however, there is no indication at the time of publication that such a visit has been planned. Israeli Transport Minister Miri Regev visited Rabat in late August, prompting large-scale mobilizations and gatherings in major cities such as Rabat, Tangier, Tetouan and Marrakech. Israel’s newly appointed Deputy Foreign Minister Michel Buskila is expected to visit Morocco soon, although details of this visit are limited in public sources. 

The only historic movement restriction on record is the 9pm nationwide curfew during the 2021 campaign. That was a direct COVID-19 measure, and a repeat is unlikely. In the previous elections in 2021, no election-specific gathering locations were identified for Casablanca, Marrakech or Tangier, though again, COVID-19 restrictions were in place at the time. Gatherings were reported in Rabat, though these were concentrated at political party headquarters. With no equivalent restriction in 2026, street-level activity on results night may exceed what the 2021 precedent suggests.

Terrorism 

The threat of a terrorist attack targeting the Morocco elections and related infrastructure has been assessed as possible.

The last successful mass casualty attack occurred in April, 2011, when an improvised explosive device (IED) was detonated at a café in Marrakech. The last Islamic State (IS)-inspired attack occurred in 2023 when three men killed a police officer in a remote part of Casablanca. Nonetheless, the US State Department maintains a Level 2 Advisory citing active terrorist plotting against tourist locations, transportation hubs, markets and government facilities. All of the aforementioned target locations overlap with election infrastructure. 

Morocco's Bureau Central d'Investigation Judiciaire (BCIJ) has arrested more than 1,000 suspected jihadists since 2015 and reports the disruption of several cells annually. IS-Sahel is known to operate along a corridor through northern Morocco into Spain, facilitating financing, logistics and recruitment in both countries. Three recent incidents detected by samdesk illustrate the BCIJ’s reported successes in disrupting this corridor: the February, 2025, arrests of the Lions of the Caliphate cell operating under direct IS-Sahel command, a March, 2026, Tangier-Mallorca cell dismantled before planning an attack in Spain and the July, 2026, operation involving the arrest of 10 suspects across seven cities during which a modified vehicle was assessed as ready for a vehicle-ramming or person-borne IED attack. Vehicle-borne IED, vehicle-ramming and bladed weapon attacks are thus assessed as the most likely attack methodologies in the event of an attack.

Controversies during outgoing PM Akhannouch’s tenure may elevate the risk of an attack during this election process, as deepening ties with Israel may further elevate Morocco’s IS-Sahel target profile. However, previous attacks have not successfully targeted election infrastructure, and BCIJ’s reported success with uncovering attack plots mitigate this threat. 

Cybersecurity and Influence Campaign Analysis

The risk of cybersecurity threats disrupting the 2026 elections has been assessed as almost certain.

A 2026 investigation by the Arab Reporters for Investigative Journalism found that pro-government networks had been running coordinated campaigns to manufacture false consensus, favor the RNI party and target opponents on Facebook. National Human Rights Council Chairperson Amina Bouayach has warned that AI-driven deepfakes, automated disinformation and micro-targeting operations threaten to amplify existing threats of voter manipulation. 

Moreover, digital gender-based harassment campaigns are also identified as an ongoing threat. The National Observatory for Protection from Digital Violence recorded at least 10 female candidates targeted by organized intimidation campaigns during July and early August, 2026, before official campaigning had begun. Morocco has legislated in response: Article 51 bis of Organic Law 53.25, in force since January, 2026, punishes the use of social media, AI tools and electronic platforms to circulate fabricated content relating to candidates. Enforcement capacity against domestic fake-account networks remains untested, therefore continued harassment and intimidation of female candidates is almost certain through polling day.

Foreign cyber interference risk stems from an active Algeria-Morocco hacktivist conflict. April, 2025, saw the National Social Security Fund breached and multiple Moroccan government sites hit by coordinated "Kill Chain" style DDoS attacks attributed by Moroccan analysts to Algeria-linked “digital militias.” Whilst no threat against an election-results platform has been identified, a results-night DDoS attempt remains possible.

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