US Midterm Elections 2026

Background

The 2026 US midterm elections are scheduled to take place on November 3. The election will determine control of all 435 seats in the House of Representatives, 35 Senate seats, 36 governorships and thousands of state legislative seats nationwide. Several key issues have featured in the midterm campaigns so far, including reaction to the current administration, the Iran war, affordability concerns, immigration and deep partisan distrust.

With the Republican Party currently holding a narrow congressional majority, this election will prove consequential for the sitting administration. Races in the House of Representatives are developing as particularly charged due to recent partisan redistricting, such as in Texas and California. There have also been growing tensions surrounding the issues of postal voting and armed Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents being deployed at polling sites. 

This briefing highlights the key battlegrounds and risks associated with the 2026 midterm election. The following threats have been assessed to impact samdesk clients:

• Protests - Almost certain

• Threats to polling stations - Likely

• Threats to politicians and candidates - Likely

• Terrorism - Possible

• Cybersecurity - Likely

• Disinformation and influence operations - Likely

Physical Security Analysis 

Protests 

Protest activity around the midterms is almost certain. Protests are likely to remain peaceful and localized before election day.  However, after polls close on November 3, contested vote counts, federal intervention, acts of political violence or other escalation triggers are possible. Such triggers may instigate rapid, large-scale protests at count centers, government buildings and/or high-profile public spaces across the country. Such disruption, if it develops, has the potential to persist through the swearing-in of congress on January 3, 2027.

Possible disruptions derived from election-related protests include road closures, transit rerouting and fencing/barricades, particularly near government buildings and election offices.

Count centers and other election facilities are possible flashpoints for protest action. Toss-up senate states - including Michigan, Georgia, Maine, Ohio, North Carolina, Texas, Iowa and Alaska - face a higher risk of vote recounts and may consequently see more protest activity. In 2018, rival demonstrators protested for days outside the Broward County, Florida, elections office during a vote recount. 

In 2020, supporters of US President Donald Trump protested outside count centers in Detroit, Michigan, and Phoenix, Arizona. In 2022, armed “vigilantes” watching over mail-in ballot drop boxes in Maricopa County, Arizona, prompted voter intimidation complaints. In the lead-up to the 2026 midterms, Indivisible, a grassroots democracy advocacy group’s Hands Off Our Vote program suggested mobilizing large-scale protests if ballots were seized, counts halted or winners not sworn in as planned.

Other recent midterm-related protests mobilizations include the No Kings: Vote Early Nationwide Day of Action on October 17. Organizers framed the protest as a peaceful voter turnout initiative rather than a mass demonstration with block parties, rallies and group walks to polling places in wards across the country. Some affiliate events called for gatherings at state capital buildings.

Previous No Kings events have at times seen instances of violence and/or police intervention. At a June 2025 No Kings event in Salt Lake City, Utah, a reported volunteer fatally shot an armed counter protester. While in March 2026, Los Angeles Police deployed tear gas and made dozens of arrests after protesters reportedly failed to adhere to a dispersal order. 

Federal enforcement is a key escalation factor. Any federal intervention in vote tabulation, targeting polling officials or disrupting electoral processes is likely to lead to demonstrations. Despite contrary reporting, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Markwayne Mullin has said that ICE agents will not patrol polling locations and may only enter if investigating a “threat” or executing a warrant. The DHS is also reportedly in the midst of a surge in voter fraud investigations. Arrests related to such investigations, including that of election officials, could trigger protests. 

Threats to polling stations and public service buildings

Election security officials are preparing for a range of threats targeting polling stations and public institutions, including voter intimidation, swatting calls and bomb threats, as well as harassment and violent threats against election workers.

Voter Intimidation

Mullin has also said that National Guard troops or ICE agents could potentially be deployed to polling stations to respond to “specific threats”. Earlier this year, ICE agents confronted a poll worker during primary elections in Syracuse, New York. A coalition of advocacy groups has filed lawsuits against the government, citing that these acts interfere with free and fair elections by promoting fear and intimidation among voters. Despite several calls to avoid federal agents' intervention, such action at electoral sites and public buildings during the upcoming midterms is possible.  

Swatting Calls, Suspicious Items and Bomb Threats

The US Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has released the 2026 Election Infrastructure Security Plan, highlighting existing physical threats to polling stations. These include swatting calls and bomb threats. In 2024, approximately 200 bomb threats targeting polling stations were made during the presidential election, which resulted in brief disruptions and enhanced security measures. Recent surveys suggest polling stations are likely to face threatening emails, phone calls and social media posts referencing physical threats at voting locations. However, chances of voting disruptions remain low. 

Harassment and Violent Threats Against Workers

Though physical violence has remained uncommon over the years, online harassment, abuse and violent phone or email death threats have escalated and emerged as a predominant form of threat towards polling workers. Election offices are therefore spending a significant amount of resources to protect their personnel during the election. A mix of online threats targeting workers is possible, especially during election day and in the weeks following the vote. 

Threats to politicians and candidates

Threats against US politicians and candidates have increased and remain elevated heading into the midterm elections. These have ranged from online and verbal abuse to death threats, doxxing, swatting, threats against family members and rare physical attacks. 

Candidates remain potential targets throughout the campaign at rallies, campaign offices, public appearances and even their residences. 

On September 6, an armed individual forced his way through a crowd toward Ohio gubernatorial candidate Amy Acton while she was speaking at the Canfield Fair. The incident injured two people. Tennessee gubernatorial candidate David Hatley received death threats during his campaign, including a “drop out or die” message spray-painted outside of his campaign headquarters. These types of tactics targeting politicians are likely to continue during and after the election. 

Terrorism

There are currently no official advisories regarding a terrorist threat, per the Homeland Security’s National Terrorism Advisory System. However, the current level of political tension in the US elevates the threat landscape. Acts of political violence and terrorism during the midterm elections are possible. 

The most significant terrorism risk associated with the 2026 midterms stems from domestic actors across the ideological spectrum, specifically lone wolves acting without the support of a wider network. The politically motivated assassination of lawmakers in Minnesota in June 2025 and the confrontation of Ohio’s Democratic nominee for governor by an armed individual at a fair in September 2026 demonstrate the threat posed by lone wolves and small cells motivated by political grievances. These attackers are increasingly difficult to detect and do not fit neatly into traditional categories of terrorism, making advanced detection a challenge for security services.

The sustained political rivalry ahead of the midterms carries radicalization risks. The prolonged period of civil unrest over the past few years could attract more violence-prone actors who may view the heightened media profile of the election period as an opportunity to advance ideological objectives. This threat remains possible, with attacks or plots against candidates, vote counters and voters themselves recorded in each of the past several election cycles. 

Additionally, social media and encrypted online communities play a significant role in the radicalization of these individuals while making detection more difficult. Organized groups have adapted to this landscape, developing strategies to inspire and guide isolated individuals remotely and providing instruction on targets and methods without ever making direct contact. In 2024 alone, there were foiled plots to assassinate Trump, the then presumptive Republican presidential nominee, an ISIS–inspired attack on crowds of people on election day and a plan to kill Black concertgoers in Atlanta, Georgia, in a reported attempt to trigger a race war and impose martial law amidst the election. All three were planned by no more than two people. 

Armed groups at polling places and bomb threats targeting polling stations are additional risks consistent with patterns documented in the 2024 election cycle but are more likely to be used as intimidation tactics as opposed to planned acts of violence. Bomb threats during the 2024 election cycle were predominantly linked to foreign disruption campaigns. Both lone wolf and organized attacks remain possible during the midterm election period. 

Cybersecurity Threats

The threat of a cyberattack disrupting the election process is likely. Recent cyberattacks on water and wastewater systems in several states have highlighted the continued vulnerability of US strategic infrastructure, such as election systems. A direct manipulation of vote counts is considered unlikely, as most voting equipment is typically not connected to the internet and produces a paper record as a backup, per The Atlantic. However, other parts of the election infrastructure remain vulnerable, including voter registration systems and state and local websites that report results. Distrust in the electoral process remains high. Authorities are concerned this could be exploited through influence operations, including by causing outages, spreading misinformation or stealing voters' personal data.

The ongoing US-Iran conflict compounds this threat. US authorities, including CISA, have warned that Iran possesses both the intent and the cyber capabilities to actively target critical US election infrastructure. Attributing these attacks can also be difficult because cyber actors route operations through infrastructure outside their home countries, complicating efforts to identify those responsible. 

CISA has been tasked as the main federal agency to manage cyber threats against the US. However, recent funding restrictions and staffing reductions have raised concerns over its ability to support state and local election officials. While CISA is preparing to increase consultations with election officials ahead of November, some states are turning to private cybersecurity firms and local resources to strengthen their defenses.

Disinformation and Influence Operations

The threat of disinformation and targeted influence operations remains likely. The Brennan Center for Justice notes that artificial intelligence (AI) is now a standard feature of foreign influence operations, enabling actors to produce synthetic images, videos, audio and online personas at lower cost and in ways that make them appear more realistic and credible to audiences. These campaigns exploit existing political divisions, increase voter apathy and undermine confidence in democratic institutions and electoral processes.

Social media can increase the reach of these campaigns, as false information can spread faster than it can be verified in that environment. Users may knowingly or unknowingly amplify AI-generated content, allowing foreign influence campaigns to reach large audiences without direct involvement from the original actor. This dynamic was illustrated in February 2026, when fabricated images reportedly depicting New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani and his mother alongside Jeffrey Epstein circulated online. 

An October 2026 report by the Council on Foreign Relations identified Russia, China and Iran as the primary foreign adversaries posing threats to the upcoming elections through influence and interference operations. All three have previously used coordinated social media campaigns, fabricated news sites, manipulated images and videos, and other deceptive content to influence political discourse and undermine confidence in elections. 

In March, the European Council on Foreign Relations reported that China had paid individuals to pose as Western journalists and influencers to promote pro-Beijing messaging. Russia has similarly moved beyond fake online personas, with its state-controlled Social Design Agency reportedly hacking legitimate Bluesky accounts to distribute fabricated news stories.

The primary target of operations such as this during the midterm elections is likely to be public trust, American political discourse, social cohesion and the information environment surrounding the election, rather than the integrity of election infrastructure itself.